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When, in the words of one jubilant reporter, Hawaii joined "the sister-
hood of states and territories amid a blaze of glory," few dedicated
customs officers could have shared in the enthusiasm.1 The law enforce-
ment record of the far western territories was very poor; indeed, some
observers charged that the conferral of territorial status, far from ensur-
ing efficient administration, merely drew incompetent job-seekers into
government service. California, Oregon, Washington and Alaska supplied
a depressing abundance of examples of what one contemporary con-
sidered "the blacklegs and . . . carpetbaggers of the West."2 An island
group thousands of miles from major continental ports, furthermore,
posed unusual and difficult enforcement problems. Finally, Hawaii's
reputation for adhering to any customs regulations was, to put it mildly,
not the best.
Hawaii had been a chief beneficiary of the commercial invasion of the
Pacific following publication of Cook's findings. The traders who
swarmed into the region found the Hawaiian Islands an ideal way-station
and haven. Fur traders and whalers provisioned there, and for several
decades in the early 19th Century the islands supported a brisk sandal-
wood trade as well.3 Of more lasting importance was the fact that Hawaii
came to dominate the developing trade routes in the north Pacific.
Traded there were whale oil and bone from the Kodiak, Japanese and
equatorial whaling grounds, furs, flour, salmon, lumber and spars from
the Pacific Northwest, and beche-de-mer, tortoise-shell, pearls and
pearl-shell, edible birds' nests and coral moss, as well as sandalwood
from Hawaii and other Pacific Islands. Honolulu emerged as a base of
operations in the trade between North America and Asia conducted by
the Hudson's Bay Company and other British, French and Russian
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interests. By far the most active were the New England traders, for
whom Hawaii became a vital link in an earth-encircling commerce that
tied Atlantic seaboard ports to the west coast of South America,
California, Oregon and Puget Sound ports, Russian America, some of
the Pacific islands, and China, India and sometimes Britain on the
return voyage.4
By the time of Mexican independence, other American trading vessels
had been committed to a relay system, sailing from Canton to Hawaii,
from there to California, South American ports and on to the Atlantic
seaboard, then back to Hawaii. Regular steamship connections augmented
the sailing fleets. Honolulu became a port-of-call on the Pacific Mail
Steam Navigation Company's San Francisco to Hong Kong run in 1866.
By the mid-1880's, that run had been captured by Claus Spreckels'
Oceanic Steamship Company, and Honolulu could boast both a semi-
monthly steamer connection with San Francisco and a monthly service
to British colonies "down under." Trade mounted steadily. Hawaiian
Customs reported total annual imports valued at over $1.5 million in
1872—a total that would grow to more than $4.6 million by 1884. In
the same years, exports grew from over $1.6 million to nearly $8 million.
On the eve of United States annexation, the reported value of exports
had risen to $16,021,775.14, that of imports to $7,682,628.09.5
The same advantages that accounted for her rapid commercial growth
helped make Hawaii a major base of operations in the Pacific's con-
traband trade. In the strictest sense, much of the commerce of the
Pacific in the early years was illicit, since the mercantilist doctrine of
restricting trade to carriers of the mother country remained ensconced
in trade regulations, if not actively enforced. Vessels visiting Spanish
ports in the Pacific in search of provisions technically violated that
nation's customs laws. Ships engaged in trading along the northwest
coast of America without expensive licences from the moribund South
Seas Trading Company broke British law. Russian attempts to ban trade
in liquor and firearms in Russian America, and later Mexican, Canadian
and American efforts to regulate and heavily tax trade items from the
Pacific region, increased potential profit by increasing the risks, and
drew many traders into smuggling. The unpopularity of tariffs and of
the officials who sought to collect them, and the seeming futility of
attempts at enforcing them, led to a tendency to ignore them altogether.
A truly free trade developed, vigorously pursued despite the laws
theoretically in force. At the center of that trade, seldom molested by
the gunboats of the great powers, Hawaii was potentially a smuggler's
paradise.6
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The Pacific traders, as one writer has noted, "hung their consciences
on Cape Horn as they went by."7 Whalers from New England often
traded illegally along the coast of South America, then sailed for Hawaii
to replenish their supplies before undertaking their primary mission.
Many other ships that made Honolulu their home port sold contraband
goods in the ports of North and South America. Dozens of small sailing
craft from Vancouver Island and Puget Sound dashed to and from
Hawaii, smuggling back valuable cargoes.8 Hawaii played a relatively
small role in the transport of illegal aliens into the United States after
the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, but served as a major
port in the contraband opium traffic that assumed important proportions
by the 1870s because of the large concentration of Chinese laborers
already on the Pacific Slope.9
Her harbors prosperous and crowded partly because of such smuggling
activities, Hawaii was not immune to the subversion of her own customs
laws. European penetration of the Islands had erased much of the
authority of the Hawaiian crown, and the westernized government that
had taken shape in the 19th Century pursued policies crafted to facilitate
expatriate development and posed no serious threat to the contraband
traders. A handful of police and other public officials kept a lassitudinous
watch on law enforcement. In Hawaii, where, as in some other Pacific
ports, the waterfronts teemed with criminals, an insistence on strict
adherence to the law could prove dangerous. An 1852 mob had burned
down Honolulu's police station; brawls and riots were common occur-
rences in later years.10 Except for intermittent, missionary-inspired
attempts to curb a thriving liquor trade, Hawaiian Customs, at least
until the establishment of the Provisional Government, appeared to
operate on the theory that their main task was to collect duties from
honest traders at the principal ports, not chase smugglers among the
Islands. Inter-island commerce, in fact, lay outside Customs jurisdiction
until American annexation.11
The only significant departure from this policy was forced by the
public reaction against the massive importation of opium which accom-
panied the sugar companies' recruitment of Chinese laborers. The 1874
legislative session witnessed passage of a law prohibiting the importation
or sale of opium except for medicinal purposes. Smugglers moved
quickly to supply the Islands. Considerable official concern was expressed
over the ensuing contraband trade, but enforcement staffs and tactics
remained virtually unchanged. A growing number of political leaders
advocated a licensing system as a remedy, and a measure so providing
was finally adopted in 1886. Charges of graft in the franchise issuing
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brought a reinstatement of prohibition the following year. A licensing
system was introduced again in 1892, after widespread rumors of police
and customs connivance in the renewed smuggling, but prohibition
returned the next year with the onset of the Provisional Government.12
Thereafter, for the remaining years of Hawaiian autonomy, smugglers and
Customs officers settled in grimly to an unending, inconclusive struggle.
The opium traders conducted their business with shrewdness and
dash. They practiced most of the age-old tricks of the trade—the use of
false manifests, caches at isolated locations, the camouflage of contraband
as duty-free cargo—while taking advantage of favorable conditions in
Hawaii.13 The Islands' long stretches of unguarded sea coast were
ideally suited to their purposes. Vessels disguised as sealers or freighters
either transferred the opium to small boats and coastal traders or
delivered it directly to waiting accomplices on beaches near the sugar
plantations or villages where it was to be sold. The large and growing
opium market in Honolulu was supplied by entrusting the contraband
to crewmen aboard those ships that regularly visited there. Crewmen
themselves carried it ashore in small quantities on their persons, or it
was hidden in consignments of goods meant for legitimate businesses in
the city. There is evidence that some of Honolulu's "respectable"
businessmen were parties to the smuggling.14
Confronting the smugglers was a small, poorly-equipped Customs
force that had been organized in 1843. From the beginning, it was a
haole organization. At top strength, four men per watch guarded
Honolulu harbor, which had been dredged and enlarged in the final
years of the 19th Century and sometimes welcomed five entering
steamers in a day. Token contingents were stationed at the Islands'
smaller ports: Lahaina, Kahului and Hana on Maui; Hilo, Kailua,
Kealakekua, Mahukona and Honoipu on Hawaii; and Koloa, Waimea
and Makaweli on Kauai. The Hawaiian Customs Department possessed
several old row boats (and on one occasion rented a small steamer), but
had no revenue cutter.15
During the 1890's, successive collectors-general attempted to improve
enforcement procedures and conditions. Larger appropriations were
sought to increase available manpower. A special fund was created for
renting steamers for patrol duty and for employing investigators and
informers in Victoria and Vancouver, British Columbia, and San
Francisco, major trans-shipment centers for the processed smoking
opium smuggled into Hawaii.16 The results were disappointing, however.
The department's contacts in British Columbia and California habitually
sent warnings of suspicious vessels that reached Hawaii after the ships
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had arrived and departed, and in one instance when a rented steamboat
was used as a revenue cutter, it carried a group of customs men and
police to a small cove that seemed a likely site for smuggling activities.
After a long wait, during which the surveillance forces accomplished
only the repainting of the hull of the hired steamer, they returned to
Honolulu. (The smugglers arrived at the expected time but used another
harbor.) Such efforts ended in 1897, and Hawaiian Customs returned
to the "laissez-faire" policies of earlier days.17
Contraband goods, particularly opium, continued to flow into Hawaii—
hidden in tin kettles, cases of apples, rifle cartridges and hams and
sausages, and slipped ashore at busy wharves as well as uninhabited
beach locations.18 Despite a few successful raids, Customs authorities
acknowledged defeat. " . . . An effective surveillance [is] the most
important branch of our work," the Collector-General had averred in
1893. "It remains the most inadequately equipped."19 A few months
before American annexation, the Collector-General pronounced his
department "inadequate to meet the most ordinary demands."20
How would annexation affect the regulations of Hawaiian trade?
Residents would wait nearly two years to find out. Although public
ceremonies honoring the resolution of annexation and the apparent
transfer of sovereignty were staged in Honolulu August 12, 1898,
Congress temporized in the matter of extending actual territorial status
and United States laws, including Customs laws and regulations, to
Hawaii.21 Thus President McKinley directed that the structure and
personnel of the Hawaiian Republic would remain in place until
Congressional action.22 A considerable amount of confusion resulted,
and some tried to profit from it.
Trading companies sought to make large-scale profits on goods taxed
at a lesser rate in Hawaii than in the United States by stockpiling them
at Honolulu before initiation of United States Customs regulation. Once
entered at the generally lower rates—the new Dingley Tariff of 1897
was, as Professor Taussig justly characterized it, "the outcome of an
aggressive spirit of protection"—the goods could be stored until territo-
rial status was fully established, then sold on the mainland as domestic
articles of commerce.23 Merchants importing for the Hawaiian market
also increased their orders to avoid the higher American duties. Imports
from Germany in 1898, for example, grew by 82.4 per cent, those from
Great Britain by close to 49 per cent, from Australia, New Zealand,
British Columbia and Canada by more than 38 per cent. While the
American State Department's special agent in Hawaii, Harold Sewall,
urged his government to hurry the extension of federal customs control
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to the Islands to prevent further revenue losses, some Hawaiian residents,
angry about the increasing jurisdictional confusion, threatened suit
against the interim government, insisting that with the transfer of
sovereignty came a constitutional right to uniformity of tariff rates.24
In the meantime, actual trade regulation in Hawaii, already at a
seeming minimum, deteriorated still further. Engaged in a dangerous
and costly battle against an outbreak of bubonic plague in Honolulu's
Chinese district, and with the prospect of losing all of the revenue from
tariff duties as soon as territorial status took effect, the government of
Sanford Dole drastically cut the Customs Department budget. The
reduced overhead meant that Hawaiian Customs expended about seven
cents for each dollar in tariff revenue, slightly over half of the cost of
collecting American tariff monies. It also meant that the customs force
was completely overwhelmed by shipping traffic. In addition to rapidly
increasing commerce, Honolulu's harbor was crowded with United
States Navy vessels, for early in the war with Spain the War Department
had decided to send all transport vessels bound for the Philippine
Islands from San Francisco via Honolulu. Between two and three a
week anchored there. Seventeen American warships utilized Honolulu's
harbor facilities during the war, as well. Under such conditions, Sewall
informed Secretary Hay, it was "now impossible to prevent smuggling,
and to protect merchandise on the wharves."25
When the Hawaiian Collector-General, Richard Ivers, resigned at
the end of September, 1899, Sewall urged the McKinley administration
to select a replacement wisely and to make it clear that the appointment
issued from the President.26 Sewall's advice was acted upon, although
Dole made the actual selection: Edward R. Stackable, who had emigrated
to Hawaii in 1890 and had served in the Hawaiian government since
1894. Stackable was Hawaii's last Collector-General. He remained to
serve the United States Treasury Department as Collector of Customs
for Hawaii through the first decade of territorial government.27 There
was little that Stackable or anyone could have done, under the circum-
stances, to assert firm control over trade and revenue in the Islands.
Stackable did demonstrate considerable administrative talent in using
his pathetically small resources efficiently and thus smoothing the
transition to full territorial status.
Congress approved an enabling act for the Territory of Hawaii April
30, 1900; it took effect in Hawaii June 14, and with it, the United States
Tariff Act of 1897.28 Hawaiian Customs was transformed nearly intact
into a branch of U.S. Customs. Honolulu remained the principal
port-of-entry. Subports were established at Hilo, Mahukona and
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Kahului. Just as Stackable remained in charge, so he was permitted to
keep E. H. Bailey in his post as deputy collector.29 Most of Stackable's
personnel stayed on, although one inspector, reviewing the list of official
duties supplied by the Treasury Department, decided upon early
retirement. "Owing to advancing life and infirmity," he wrote, "it does
not seem advisable that I continue connection with the Customs Service,
when the change from former methods terminate. . . ."30
Staff members (and contraband traders) were soon reassured that,
initially, little would be altered under the new regime. The annual visit
of a revenue cutter provided no better surveillance than the previous
reliance upon occasionally rented steamers. The coastal trade, unregu-
lated before, remained unregulated, at least for vessels of United States
registry. Hawaii's prohibition on imports of smoking opium was replaced
with a high tax, which also acted as an inducement to smuggling.31 The
fact that customs returns, which previously had accounted for the bulk
of the Hawaiian government's revenue, now were turned over to the
federal government, probably reduced appreciably the zeal of officialdom
and public alike in seeing tariff regulations carried out. Although
commerce continued to increase—Honolulu was among the twelve
busiest United States ports-of-entry by the beginning of the new
century—the amounts collected in fines and forfeitures dwindled from
only $87.00 in 1897 to nothing in 1899 and 1900.32
Yet from the standpoint of those who favored improved trade regula-
tions, the future did not appear wholly bleak. Hawaiian Customs had
avoided the wholesale turnover in personnel that had been a common
feature of other territories, and Collector Stackable utilized the still
rather vague and incomplete civil service regulations to protect his staff
from the pressures of the patronage system. If it was an exaggeration to
claim, as one journalist did, that Hawaii's territorial government stood
among "the highest and purest form of public administration," it was
probably correct to characterize United States Customs administration
under Stackable as deserving of "respect and confidence."33 In focusing
his administrative energies on staff professionalism rather than on
expensive anti-smuggling operations, Stackable was following the lead
of mainland customs administrators who had concluded that absolute
regulation in an age of high tariffs was an impossible, self-defeating
objective. Of course, most of his predecessors in the Hawaiian Customs
Department had followed a similar approach—tax and regulate those
who obey the law, and waste as little effort and funding as possible in
hunting down those who do not—but they had not had to cope with the
territorial spoils system.34
75
Stackable's staff remained very small, and the cost of revenue collec-
tion, .073 cents for each dollar collected, was well below the Bureau of
Customs average. Still, Customs receipts totalled about $1,200,000 or
more annually between 1901 and 1905; the yearly total in fines and
forfeitures climbed to $3,764.28 by 1905.35 At least temporarily, the
emphasis on cost-effectiveness seemed to be working. It did so because
the triumph of steam-powered vessels on the high seas and the consolida-
tion of oceanic shipping into a few large companies reduced the number
of independent trading vessels crowding into Honolulu and plying
coastal waters searching for trade, legal or illegal. By the early years of
this century, most of Hawaii's shipping was conducted by deep-draught
steamships that could visit only large, improved harbors like Honolulu's.
Even the inter-island trade was largely in the hands of the Wilder
Steamship Company, which had merged with its chief rival, the Inter
Island Steam Navigation Company, in 1905. Customs officials found it
easier to work with representatives of a few large firms in attempting
tariff enforcement.36
Installation of cable communications with the mainland in 1903 and
improvements in Customs Bureau organization and equipment in this
period also improved the efficiency of such trade regulation as was
attempted.37 Smuggling continued, of course, the eternal sideline of
ships' officers, crewmen and dock workers, and increasingly, the activity
of entrepreneurs specializing in the high-risk, high-profit drug trade.
But in the first years of the 20th Century, before the completion of the
Panama Canal revolutionized trade routes, and before the momentous
political decision that made Customs officers the enforcers of liquor and
drug prohibition on an unprecedented scale, it appeared that all was
well. Hawaii had survived, even benefitted from territorial rule. "Behind
[was] the garland and the song; before [was] the whirr and rush of
commercial life, a realization of Seward's dream of Pacific empire, a
sound of hoarse whistles and rushing wheels at the cross-roads of the
ocean. . . ,"38
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